This month, President Biden hosted one of Washington’s most lavish state dinners in recent memory. Celebrities and billionaires flocked to the White House for a meal honoring Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan, posing for photos in front of elaborate performances by Japanese fans. Jeff Bezos stops by; Paul Simon provided entertainment.
The spectacle was part of a carefully choreographed series of events designed to showcase the new relationship between the US and Japan – and the remarkable transformation of US security alliances in Asia. The next day, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. of the Philippines was also in the US capital to attend the historic US-Japan-Philippines summit in which a new trilateral security partnership was announced.
Both events are aimed at the same audience: China.
Over the years, Washington has built a series of multilateral security agreements like this in the Asia-Pacific region. Although US officials confirm that the recent mobilization of allies and partners is not aimed at China, don’t believe it. Indeed, Mr. Kishida emphasized in his speech to the National Assembly on April 11 that China presents “the greatest strategic challenge” to both Japan and the international community.
Of course, China’s recent activity is worrying. Its military has acquired ever more effective means of countering American and allied capabilities in the Western Pacific and has behaved aggressively in the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait and elsewhere, causing Neighboring countries are concerned.
But Washington’s pursuit of an increasingly complex web of security relationships is a dangerous game. Those relationships include upgraded defense capabilities, more joint exercises, deeper intelligence sharing, new initiatives on defense production and technology cooperation, and Strengthen contingency planning and military coordination. All of which could make Beijing more cautious about the blatant use of military power in the region. But the new alliance structure in itself is not a long-term guarantor of peace and stability in the region – it may even increase the risk of falling into conflict.
The security partnership launched this month in Washington is just the latest in a string of new defense configurations spanning Asia and the Pacific. In 2017, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, was revived, promoting cooperation between the United States, Japan, Australia and India. In September 2021, Australia, Britain and the United States began a partnership, known as AUKUS, and the United States, Japan and South Korea committed to closer cooperation during the summit at Camp David in August 2021. last.
All of these moves have been motivated largely by concerns about Beijing, which in turn has criticized these countries as part of a US-led effort to create an Asian version of NATO designed to contain China. There is no equivalent to a collective defense treaty like the NATO treaty, whose Article 5 considers an armed attack on one member “an attack against all.” However, China will almost certainly see the latest agreement between the US, Japan and the Philippines – with which it has an active territorial dispute – as further confirmation of the Washington-led effort to threaten China’s interests.
It is unclear how Beijing will react. But it could double down on the expansion of its military capabilities and increase its use of military and paramilitary forces to assert its territorial claims in the region, especially with regard to the issue of Taiwan’s sensitivity. Beijing could also promote further military cooperation with Russia in the form of increased military exercises and deployments.
The end result could be an even more divided and dangerous Asia-Pacific region than today, marked by a deepening arms race. In this increasingly contested and militarized environment, the likelihood of some political incident or military accident triggering a devastating regional war is likely to increase. This is especially likely, given the lack of meaningful US and allied crisis communication channels with China to prevent such an incident from spiraling out of control.
To prevent this nightmare, the United States and its allies and partners must invest more in diplomacy with China, in addition to strengthening military deterrence.
To start, the United States and key allies such as Japan should make sustained efforts to establish a long-term crisis prevention and management dialogue with China that includes the participation of security agencies and foreign policy of each country. To date, such dialogue has been largely limited to military channels and topics. It is important that both civilian and military officials understand the many possible sources of inadvertent crises and develop ways to prevent or manage them if they occur. This process should include establishing a set of leaders’ agreed upon best practices for crisis management and a trusted but informal channel through which stakeholders can discuss crisis prevention insights.
The immediate focus of the United States and Japan is to avoid actions that increase tensions across the Taiwan Strait. The deployment of US military trainers to Taiwan on a seemingly regular basis and suggestions by some US officials and policy analysts that Taiwan be considered a pillar of security America’s overall defense posture in Asia is an unnecessary provocation. They also openly contradict long-standing American views. “one China” policyAccordingly, the United States ends the deployment of all US military forces to Taiwan and does not consider Taiwan an important security location for the United States, only interested in the Taiwan issue being resolved peacefully. peacefully and without coercion.
For its part, Japan has also become more cautious about its “one China” policy, hesitant to clearly reaffirm that Tokyo does not support Taiwanese independence. Recent statements by some political leaders in Tokyo about the readiness of Japanese military forces to help defend Taiwan will almost certainly anger China’s leaders, who remember that Japan occupied Taiwan after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 and ’95.
Washington and Tokyo should clearly reaffirm their previous commitments on the China-Taiwan dispute. Tokyo should also confirm that it does not support any unilateral Taiwanese move toward independence and resist U.S. efforts to force Japan to commit to defending Taiwan. Even though American officials have is said to be urging Japan participates in military planning for the Taiwan conflict, the vast majority of Japanese people do not support fighting to defend Taiwan. Tokyo can best contribute to deterring China by focusing on strengthening its ability to defend its islands.
Washington and its allies should shift to a more proactive approach toward China that promotes adaptation and restraint. This could include efforts to ensure credible mutual assurances on limits on Chinese military deployments, such as amphibious forces and missile capabilities related to Taiwan , in exchange for US limits on the level and type of weapons it sells to the island. They could also explore increased security cooperation with China regarding cyberattacks, protection of sea lanes and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as better cooperation to combat climate change and the outbreak of another pandemic.
Of course, China has its own role to play. Ultimately, Beijing and the United States both want to avoid a crisis and conflict in the region. Therefore, the country should respond to the more cooperative approach of the United States and its allies by reducing its own coercive behavior in relation to maritime disputes.
None of this will be easy, given the intense suspicion that now exists between Beijing, Washington and their allies. But new thinking and new diplomatic efforts could encourage China to respond in meaningful ways. At least it’s worth trying. Focusing solely on military deterrence will not be effective. Trying to find ways to cooperate with China is the best way – perhaps the only way – to steer the world away from disaster.
Mike M. Mochizuki is a professor at George Washington University and a nonresident fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Government. Michael D. Swaine is a senior researcher focusing on security topics related to China at the Quincy Institute.
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