WASHINGTON – For years, deliberate “strategic ambiguity” in Washington’s China policy has made it unclear how the United States would respond to a full-scale, amphibious invasion of Taiwan. .
But an equally conundrum — possibly more difficult, in the minds of many senior White House and defense officials — is how to deal with the slow island squeeze. Thereby Chinese forces cut off most of their access to it, either physically or digitally.
That question may soon be tested for the first time in a quarter of a century. China’s announcement during Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit that it will begin live-fire military exercises at six locations surrounding the island could trigger the biggest crisis in the Taiwan Straits yet. since 1996, when President Bill Clinton ordered the US aircraft carrier to enter the strait.
But those drills are considerably farther from Taiwan’s shores than the series the Chinese government warned of with sailors and planes it planned. And it takes place in a much more benign strategic environment, when China’s participation in the global economy is expected to modify its behavior, and when Mr. Clinton tells Chinese students that the Spreading the internet will promote freedom and dissent. That’s also when China’s military contributed a small portion of the power it prides itself on, including anti-ship missiles developed to deter American warships from approaching.
Administration officials say that based on their assessment, cutting off all access to Taiwan is unlikely – in large part because it would hurt China’s own economy by period of severe economic recession. On Friday, the Group of 7 industrialized nations, the core of the Western alliance, warned China not to retaliate against Ms. Pelosi’s visit, apparently an attempt to show that China would be widely condemned. widely for overreacting, just as Russia invaded Ukraine.
However, US officials say they are worried that events over the next few days could trigger an unintended confrontation between Chinese and Taiwanese forces, especially if the Chinese military launches missiles over the island or if an incursion into contested airspace results in a mid-air conflict. The same thing happened 20 years ago, when a Chinese military plane collided with an American intelligence gathering plane.
As the drills began early Wednesday, White House and Pentagon officials were monitoring the situation closely, trying to figure out if China would send forces into each area near the coast of Taiwan. which they have declared closed or not. But their assessment is that China’s strategy is one of intimidation and coercion, not direct conflict.
Outside experts are more concerned that the exercise could escalate.
“This is one of those difficult scenarios,” said Bonny Lin, who directed the Taiwan desk at the Pentagon and held other defense positions before moving to the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. handle. China Power Project. “If a military exercise turns to a blockade, when is it clear that the exercise is now a blockade? Who should be the first to respond? Taiwan’s forces? USA? It’s not clear.”
The move to blockade exercise is one of many frequently played scenarios in Washington, as US officials try to map out options before the crisis hits. But nothing really replicates a real-life confrontation.
Mr. Biden, aides said, will have to try to draw the fine line between avoiding rushing towards China and avoiding escalation.
It gets even more complicated when it comes to continuing the debate about how to help Taiwan become a “hedgehog,” or a country too well defended for China to invade. For all the talk of selling F-16s to Taiwan – whose fleet is expected to top 200 fighters by 2026 – there is growing worry that Taiwan is buying the wrong type. equipment for self-defense and they need to learn some lessons from Ukraine.
It’s hardly a new debate. Two years ago, a senior defense official, David F. Helvey, warned that as China’s ability to occupy the island increased, so could Taiwan itself “through smart investment, sending a clear signal to Beijing that Taiwanese society and its armed forces are committed to defending Taiwan. But he warned that the amount that the Taiwanese government has committed to acquire new defense technology is not enough to have a resilient defense.
The result has been a steady drumbeat from Washington urging Taiwan’s leadership to invest less in expensive F-16 fighter jets and more in what Helvey calls “a large number of small things.” , the latter formula that helped Ukraine fend off Russian forces.
That list includes mobile cruise missiles for coastal defense, mines, small fast attack ships and mobile artillery.
Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen has expressed support for the so-called “asymmetrical” strategy and has moved in recent years to increase defense budgets and buy more small, mobile weapons that are not American officials recommended, like the Harpoon missile. But she has at times faced resistance from some Taiwanese military officials, who argue that certain conventional weapons systems are still necessary to prepare for different situations. They also argued that without clear security guarantees from the United States, it would be too risky for Taiwan to give up its lethal weapons.
That view has changed somewhat in recent months as the war in Ukraine has shaken Taiwan’s military and public, making the hedgehog strategy more applicable. But that war has also depleted reserves and strained production capacity between US and allied defense contractors, meaning Taiwan may need to wait several years. And that delay gives China an opening.
Furthermore, Taiwan’s defense budget hovers around $17 billion annually, although the country has committed to spending an additional $8 billion on armaments over the next few years. By comparison, Congress recently allocated $52 billion in aid to Ukraine — which doesn’t have Taiwan’s revenue to pay for its defense — and China spends $230 billion annually.
Some also say that what Taiwan needs from the United States is not just arms sales, but other forms of support, from military technology to operational exchanges and training.
While Taiwan’s military is sometimes allowed to participate in defense symposiums, the country is rarely invited to major multinational military exercises as most countries do not officially recognize it as a member of the military. a country. And although Washington has gradually increased training of Taiwanese forces on the island and in the United States in recent years, the island’s mandatory military service and its reserve program are still considered inadequate. Strict.
“The US can help us learn how to train more effectively and mobilize our reserves faster,” said Ou Si-fu, a researcher at the Institute for Defense and Security Studies, an online think tank. of Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense. “They can also help more with technology transfer, to support our indigenous weapons development programs.”
Of course, defense against invasion is not the same as defense against blockade. Implementing a blockade is even harder.
“Threatening a blockade and actually starting a blockade are two very different things,” said Eric Sayers, a former senior adviser to the US Pacific Command and a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
Sayers said China has long had the ability to effectively encircle Taiwan if it chooses to do so, so the possibility in itself is not a surprise.
“Despite all the threats that Beijing has made in recent weeks, it will still be difficult and costly for the PLA Navy to maintain the blockade for a long time, Mr Sayers added. . “What harms Taipei’s economy has the same effect on Beijing.”
Sayers continued, “The most important thing about China’s response is that it gives us a preview of how the PLA might deploy an indirect blockade against Taiwan in the future to relieve pressure near a military conflict. election or other political crisis.”
“Instead of declaring a military blockade, they could instead announce an expanded military exercise around Taiwan to close or disrupt shipping routes for 30, 60, 90 days. This makes it less active militarily and becomes a form of legal warfare to justify an indirect blockade for a time that Beijing can manipulate.”
Others say the United States can do more to bolster Taiwan’s security by helping it better integrate into the global economic system. Taiwan officials and analysts say strengthening trade links and possibly passing a bilateral trade deal could help the island reduce its dependence on China, its biggest trading partner. Currently. But China will certainly consider it an act of aggression.
The geopolitical risks of Taiwan’s dependence on the Chinese market were evident this week when, just hours after Ms. Pelosi’s arrival in Taiwan, Beijing suspended exports of natural sand to the island – the main focus. construction – and banned the import of certain types of sand from Taiwan. fruit and fish.
Vincent Chao, former political director at the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in Washington, said: “Economic security is crucial to Taiwan’s survival as a democracy. .
Mark Stokes, executive director of the Project 2049 Institute, a defense research group in Arlington, Virginia, said diversifying US support for Taiwan from arms sales is important not just to better defense against China but also boost morale for a democratic partnership.
“We shouldn’t just stuff their throats with weapons and rob them of their autonomy in defining what their defense requirements are,” Mr Stokes said. “What Taiwan needs most from the United States is to be treated, treated as much as possible with ties, as a normal partner with respect.”
Eric Schmitt Reporting contributions from Washington.
